兰格格：在海一方

莲花灯

冬天回北京的时候，有一天和朋友去后海，看见夜色里有人在卖莲花灯。
北京的冬天，冷得清冽而透明，在路边和店铺的红灯笼的氲氲之灯光下，你似乎可以看见空气中飘扬着细细的冰屑。路边置放在地上点燃的莲花灯，看起来似乎有着环环细细的光影。我本来要停步细看，朋友却说：出来再买，这些卖灯的会卖到很晚。

那一夜真冷，后海的茶馆四面透风，茶馆里要用一把罗汉伞似取暖器取暖。那东西让人觉得头发会被烤焦了，可是怀里还要抱一只小暖水袋。我那天因为听音乐会，化了妆又穿得精细，不自在得很，少话多笑，心里却在走神：那么冷，那些卖莲花灯的是不是会回家了？

出门，那卖莲花灯的人果然已经走了。我问朋友，这样冷的天气，后海已经结冰了吧。

回加的飞机上，差不多一万公里就一路睡过来了。在温哥华机场转机，飞机误班，于是在STARBUCKS找了一把高高的椅子坐着喝茶。咖啡馆正对着一个滚梯，人流上上下下，一切都那么熟悉，非常不情愿的熟悉。大概依然骨子里恨透了机场，不管它有多么明亮，整齐川流不息，对我却是辗转其中。

搭了飞机，又开始昏昏的睡。我的脚下，有一只邻居女士的小卷毛狗。它装在一只小小的旅行用宠物手袋里，睡梦间听见邻居女士喃喃地和它说话：good girl, good girl, we will get home soon。

飞机快降落的时候，突然醒来。窗外正是夜色中城市的边缘，飞机一侧翼，你可以看见灯火辉煌的城市中心，然而正下方却是一块一块的居民区。一家一户，还挂着圣诞节的彩灯，所以一片小区，也成了有很多花瓣的彩色花朵，晶莹剔透。那个时候惊叹，一年时间卡城已经向外延伸了这么多，几乎和那些农庄接壤了。新的小区星星点点的镶嵌在郊外，每一片之间都有一段夜色为距离。一眼望去，竟然象一池夜色中浮出的花朵，朦胧而安静，象我想象中一池的莲花灯。

原来，从来你只有远离一座城市才会被感动。
而不幸或幸运，我一直在离开和到达中，思念和相见中，等待和重逢中，见识着两座城市中的美。这种美，仿佛和爱人决裂，然后绝处逢生。

这一次回家，父母突然在一些原先固执的问题上粗放起来，说教的姿态也变成商量的口气。你原先期待的当自己的家作自己的主，突然在这样的不管不顾中惶恐起来。默默担心，是不是在他们承认孩子的成人的时候，终于对岁月有了一些妥协。突然害怕，他们有一天是不是会老了。

而到达夜色中的城市的时候，我好像面对了一池莲花灯。飞机在慢慢降落，心中突然充满了一直许愿的热忱：假如有一片命运让我祈祷，我会选家人，爱我的人都在身边，健康而平安。

大年初一，终于和两个朋友一起去城市里唯一的寺庙里面上香。因为我们去得很早，河边那座小小的寺院里面还没有香客。寺院的出家人在唱一种6字经，还有一个剃发的女子带我们从普贤到文殊一直拜到地藏，最后带我在寺庙的神龛前点了一盏莲花灯。

那神龛前，莲花灯也摆了一片，那些灯火闪闪，让人想起教堂里摆放的许愿香烛。对，我是那种见庙就磕头进教堂就祈祷的庸俗的人，我至少在巴黎圣母院，约克大教堂，科隆大教堂，圣心教堂，牛津的圣玛丽大教堂每个地方都投过愿资，点燃过许愿的小蜡烛。

我其实从来也不是一个虔诚的教徒，无论是对东方的佛祖还是西方的神明。我只是敬畏命运的多灾多难，只是敬畏生命中德离合悲欢，才诚心膜拜。

假如，有神明路过，请原谅一个女子偷巧和蒙混之心。
人间，有一盏小小的TEA LIGHT，和一盏红色的莲花灯是我的。
只是祈求家人和我心爱的人都平安。

Cross over the dead bodies

今天吃午饭前，老板找到我说，N刚刚被通知走人了，下午不会出席新AVP的见面会。他在这2个多月的裁员过程中，一直保持着一个态度：所有他知道的人事消息，他都第一时间告诉我们。他说：我不想你们从流言蜚语里猜真相。

裁了2个月的员，媒体象报小道消息一样挖**公司全面裁员15%的消息。这15%是上千人，而且全部是白领。而我们部门的数据是25%，我们组到最后连裁带走少了一半人，周围的桌子都空了，好像是最后这一刻，我才坚持不住了。好像看见整个战场，尸痕遍野，我们几个人空空站着，并不知道怎么活下来的。

虽然被裁掉的MANAGER和我们不是一个项目，但是我们都以为裁员在1月17日已经结束了。而且昨天，我们还在一起吃FAREWELL(再见) 午餐。最近一段时间吃了太多的告别午餐啊。而今天裁掉的N，为公司工作了20年，当年也是作为最FRESH SHINING的优秀生被招进公司的，现在两个孩子在U OF T读书，公司竟然连一个提前退休的机会都没有给他。

公司的股票还在涨，这个星期已经涨了5块钱了，会计部的朋友已经告诉我，今年的FINANCIAL STATEMENT看起来会很好，然而，他们还是把一个为公司工作了20年的员工裁掉了，我坐在那里突然觉得浑身发冷。

工作4年。从来没有过任何时刻象这一刻这样深刻体会到资本家的这个词的意义。

上个星期老板就告诉我，裁员结束了，我可以疯狂去采购鞋子了。

他看我几天，毫无喜色，继续怠工到8：30才上班，警惕地问：你不是有什么想法吧？你是想换公司还是想辞职嫁人？

我知道裁员一过，剩下的人今年还有红包，还有涨工资，还有升职。还有公司员工股票，还有公司购买的退休金，还有牙医，还健身俱乐部。我的老板会来和我讨债：你去年的FA怎么没有考过，我们出了学费的。你去年计划里专业写作班怎么还没有报名，你随便报哪里；还有高级ACCESS，我们出学费。他们还会说：我们必须看着你成长，你在公司的价值才是公司的价值。Trust me, 我是商课毕业的，这些话我可以倒背如流。所有的老板都会说PEOPLE才是他们的最大财富。

其实，所谓“财富”是的一场屠杀之后，幸存者可以继续养尊处优，Cross Over the Dead Bodies.

被劝提前退休的B，祖上4代都为这个公司工作过。因为这个公司的过去太辉煌，很多人甚至以为是CROWN COP 。过去，很多人全是一辈子为这个公司工作的，甚至说自己的血管里流的是公司的血，那对他们来说是Blue Blood。他从前负责公司各地的库房，出差的常常招呼我，Joy，和我去温哥华去吃SUSHI。他离开的时候，开玩笑说：他的儿子暑假到公司来实习，你们一定得用他，第6代。

还有R，我在公司作实习生的时候就和他学过MM。很好脾气的法国老头，打电话的时候会和我故意说很多法语，然后说：你没有听懂阿，你不是MONTREAL来的？我转这个部门也是他也是推荐人。临走的他还很法式的拥抱了我一下，当着他女儿和女婿的面，后来我才知道她们在IT部工作。

据说我们的SOX项目已经花了几百万美元。公司的R2C2项目也上百万的花钱，而更多的项目是PAY那些GE、WESTJET的顾问每个小时百元以上小时工资全职的研究怎么为公司省钱，最后为了保持竞争的OPERATION RATE ，就是裁员。

跨过裁员的满目疮痍，基本上已经看清在一个资本主义大公司继续前行的轨迹。
他们不会拿出一部分红利来保留忠心的员工，他们不会看到别人的白发苍苍，他们只会看公司是不是更加挣钱。你在其中如果没有倒下，那绝不是你幸运，那是你还有价值。在这样的公司里，你只想着要每天工作超过8个小时，继续专业学习，继续UPDATE所有知识。那不是喜欢学习，那是必须。

午餐后，大老板，我们公司因为必须达到女性高层参照百分比之一，走进办公室说：N的EMAIL还可以ACCESS到晚上10点，他还来得及给我们发一封再见信。的确算网开一面了呢，其它裁的员工，通知以后门卡电脑密码马上失效，怕得是报复性泄漏资料。

什么叫残忍。

选举就是请客吃饭

选举就是请客吃饭

睡了一觉醒来，上网看结果。HARPER获胜，我们事前准备的专题稿不用改了。虽然我更喜欢马丁叔叔(因为他和我合过影，还是一个帅老头) ，但是我赢了黛姐一顿饭。大喜。

选举就是请客吃饭，还是请素斋吧，我们这里昨天又发现一头疯牛。

今天在公司里，我们那些每天努力表现自己是知识分子的同事当然谈论的都是选举。

老板，法裔后代，今天穿了一件绿色衬衫。他说，你看我的衬衫就代表了我的政见--绿党。我小声嘟囔，又不是选超女，你也不是“粉笔” ？

喜欢穿各种各样奇怪古老样式皮鞋的MIKE是一个音乐狂，他说昨天看见马丁和一个小破孩弹吉他拉选票，如此拉音乐迷票，我还是给他一票。

一到下午就对灰尘过敏打喷欠的ELAINE则说，我只要和我EX 投不同票就行了，他投马丁我就投哈珀，UNDO WHAT HE DID就是我的政见。我乐：) 加拿大女性真政治独立。

BOB是坚实的保守党人，因为他是UC同学会，虽然他其实强硬的左翼。他不喜欢哈珀，但对马丁失望，他自己说，总是给新党一个机会，看看吧。其实他代表了大部分加拿大民众，不希望美国化，却又对加拿大上届政府失望，所以选择选举一个12年没有执政过的反对党。我说，我们重组一个加拿大共产党吧。：) ：) ：)

Vote for the change,这是这次大选的口号。
果然就实现了，可见一个政治口号多么主要。

第三季度中国概念股总体状况

中国互联网公司第三季度收入增长排行榜，除了门户老大新浪业绩下滑（-5.5%）之外，其他都是增长。百度增幅172.95％，排在第一；分众146％，排在第二；网易（85.9%）为第三。中国概念股总体状况排行如下：

出席媒体记者招待会

大选在即，保守党狂拉中国票
--新生活周刊新闻照片

保守党MP：Jim Prentice 和Lee Richardson
January 21, 2006 11:00am

在一向以政治态度强硬著称的Raplh Klein为省长的ALBERTA省，保守派支持率高于全国平均支持率38%。

大选在即，两党的公关攻势已成white hot.

King Content

King content

Don't write off Hollywood and the big media groups just yet

“PAIN is temporary, film is forever.” That hopeful thought, which found its way into the original script of Peter Jackson's recent re-make of “King Kong”, might be seized upon by today's beleaguered entertainment industry. Media companies are suffering intense pain—and it is starting to seem worryingly permanent. In America shares of “old” media firms such as News Corporation, Comcast and other giants of television, film, radio and print, have fallen 25% behind the S&P 500 in the past two years, despite some heroic financial results. Meanwhile, the market value of Google, which made its debut on the stockmarket in 2004, is now equal to the combined worth of Walt Disney, News Corporation and Viacom, three beasts of the old media jungle. One investor, who recently moved two-thirds of his $1 billion fund out of American media and into emerging-market companies, moans that “the market thinks something's going to get them, whether it's piracy, personal video recorders, or Google.”

Desperate to rescue its share price, Viacom broke itself in two on January 3rd. Time Warner, the biggest media group of all, is under attack from Carl Icahn, a corporate predator perfectly adapted to sniff out the weak and vulnerable. The big groups have seen their newspapers and magazines lose readers and advertising to the internet; their music businesses suffer piracy and falling sales; and someone else's video games captivate new generations of consumers. Now come fears about film and TV, the bedrock of their business.

Hollywood took 7% less at the box office in 2005 than in 2004 and growth in sales of DVDs has slowed. Internet video threatens the satellite and cable systems of companies such as News Corporation and Time Warner. Dozens of advertisers are shifting budgets from television to such places as the internet and billboards. Brand-owners hate it that people are using digital video recorders to avoid their pitches. And if media firms move on to the internet themselves, they risk losing their films and television programmes to pirates.

Moguls still
No wonder that on media island they are downcast. Yet, if Hollywood teaches one thing, it is that stories can be re-made and dreams can come true. Rather as big retailers, including Wal-Mart and Tesco, have discovered advantages online, so too will big media companies.

True, the internet and digital devices will eventually break those companies' grip on distribution. But they gain something else: a digital world in which what you supply matters far more than how you supply it. In satellite radio, for example, Sirius has crept up on XM Satellite Radio thanks chiefly to its content, in the controversial form of Howard Stern. And this world holds another promise, too: an abundance of virtually costless ways to supply consumers with what they want to watch, whenever they want it—things established media are ideally placed to provide.

The internet is still in the digital equivalent of the silent-film era. It has been formidable for text, still images and music, but is only now, with broadband access, entering an age of high-quality video. As it does so, Time Warner, News Corporation, Disney and other media companies will be able to cash in on their film and television archives. Selling video direct to consumers, without distribution getting in the way, lets media firms, and viewers, mine their vaults for old episodes of “The Outer Limits”, Johnny Carson, or whatever: minority tastes, to be sure, but taken together, a vast new market.

Moreover, old media will command audiences for many years yet. New media understand this: Google has just bought dMarc, which sells old-fashioned radio advertising. Websites, such as BabyCenter.com and AlwaysOn, have recently launched print-magazine versions of themselves, to capture advertising that was out of their reach online. As the best remaining source of a mass audience, TV and film are the best places to create and promote the next “Simpsons” or “Narnia”.

Some people worry that new media companies may over time shunt old ones aside as producers of content. Certainly, digital media will create new stars and new businesses, but making high-quality video content will always be a daunting and expensive task. Music or a blog can be composed from a bedroom, but not an episode of “Friends”. Just last month DreamWorks, Hollywood's youngest studio, sold itself to Viacom, despite its strong financial backing and the talent of Hollywood luminaries. It made some money, but could not afford a billion-dollar investment in films year-in, year-out. Yahoo! has a media unit, but so far it hasn't had any hits. Responding to the news this week that Yahoo! intends to spend up to $10m on a reality-TV concept called “The Runner”, analysts complained that the investment would damage its margins.

By contrast with Yahoo!'s dabbling, old media is now investing in digital media in earnest. It all went terribly wrong before 2000 when bewitched executives squandered money on the internet and Time Warner sold itself to AOL in one of history's worst-ever deals. But now they are back. Rupert Murdoch, chief executive of News Corporation, made a series of acquisitions in 2005 (see article). Disney is supplying two hits, “Desperate Housewives” and “Lost”, using Apple's iTunes download service. Last summer Viacom bought Neopets.com, a virtual-pets site. Old media is well placed to steer its huge offline audiences to its websites.

Helpfully on cue, piracy now seems less of a threat. The music industry now has a healthy business in legal downloads. Operators of peer-to-peer networks, such as eDonkey, are going straight. And Hollywood is realising that it has no equivalent to a big musical weakness—that many albums consist of a few decent tracks padded by dross.

Any media business has two products to sell: its content (to readers and viewers); and its audience (to advertisers). The task for old media is first to protect its advertising revenues by amassing audiences online and, second, to offset their viewers' intolerance of mass-advertising by making them pay more for content—which they are increasingly willing to do. It will not be easy, but then saving the heroine never was.

MIMI

One of the rare cats of Van, Turkey -- with white fur, auburn markings and different-coloured eyes

Brokeback Mountain

last Holiday：人之将死之喜剧

人之将死的快乐

一句著名的英文诗句：live as you were going to die tomorrow 。假如你明天就面对死亡，那么你将选择怎么样的活着呢？这个问题在《最后假日》(last Holiday)1950年版已经被回答过一次。这一次人们还是涌向电影院，首先是看看50年以后的21世纪的电影人怎么回答，另外也是看看两位Hip Hop歌星奎恩•拉蒂法(Queen Latifah)和LL cool J在电影中的Hip Hop组合。

美国百货公司的厨具部销售员Georgina Byrd，本来生活地象城市里最普通的小职员中的一个，单身、不美也不特别聪明、不穷却也不富有。她每个周末去黑人教堂的唱诗班唱歌、去超市购物的时候最大限度的使用商家的各种优惠券(Coupon) 、把电视的烹饪节目主持人当成偶像，把做成的美味佳肴分给邻居的小男孩，自己却吃上一顿留下来的剩菜。她喜欢低着头走路，害怕老板、穿最保守的衣服，甚至不敢和自己喜欢的男人多说一句话…但是她有一本自己的Possibilities(假设之书) ，那是她梦的蓝图本，里面有她最想去度假的欧洲旅店，那个写过很多烹饪书的主厨的佳肴照片，还有她和她梦中人的剪贴而成的婚礼照片。

别怪我琐碎的细节陈述，这都是一个女人梦想和现实的落差，那永远是厨房里的灰姑娘和舞会上穿水晶鞋子的神秘美女之间的距离。当平凡的Georgina Byrd得知她得了不治之症，只可以再活3个星期的时候，她决定把她所有的假设(Possibilities) 变成现实。

她把自己的退休保险金和母亲的期货投资全兑换成了现金。飞到了位于捷克的一家五星级度假饭店Grandhotel Pupp，随便提一句，这间饭店是欧洲最古老的饭店之一，位于布拉格附近的一个滑雪圣地的半山上，其中出没的都是王孙富贾。Byrd乘坐直升飞机到达饭店，并住进4000美金一晚的总统套房。她在时装店要女店员把她打扮international(国际巨星) ，买了一衣橱昂贵的衣物以后，她象非洲公主一样盛装出现在饭店餐厅。为了在有生之日尝遍最有名的欧洲厨师Didier每天不重样的菜单，她一个人点了足够10个人吃的菜肴…这就足够了。她引起了人们对她的注意，她成了厨师Didier的好朋友，也成了饭店服务员最喜欢的这些人中还包括来自美国的政客客人。关注她的人中还有一个百货公司老板和他的小情人。是的，那个百货公司老板正是Byrd曾经工作过的公司的老板，因此，最后他费尽心机查出：他付给这个住总统套房的“富有女人”年薪是2万9千美元。

这部影片首先引人注意的是两位Hip Hop歌星奎恩•拉蒂法(Queen Latifah)和LL cool J。奎恩•拉蒂法是第一个名列好莱坞名人星光大道的Hip Hop歌星，她得过1座格莱美奖。而在剧中饰演Byrd心上人的Cool J则得到过2座葛莱美奖、15座纽约音乐奖、10座灵魂列车奖…

这部电影导演是旅美华裔导演王颖(Wayne Wang),中国观众看见Wayne Wang的名字出现在屏幕上应该和看见John Woo(吴宇森), Ang Lee(李安) 一样激动，因为他毕竟是凭借《喜福门》(The Joy Luck club) 闯进好莱坞的少数华裔导演之一，他前年的轻喜剧《曼哈顿女佣》(The Maid in Manhattan) 加上这一部《最后假日》已经为他在好莱坞奠定了商业娱乐片导演的地位。

翻看周末电影影评版，满篇都是对Hip Hop女王奎恩•拉蒂法的溢美之词。比如：奎恩终于登上了开拓她影视才华的快车、奎恩的皇家欧洲假期…这个曾经因为饰演歌舞剧《芝加哥》中的监狱女看守而获得过奥斯卡提名奖的黑人女星得到了太多的赞扬。导演王颖甚至说：她是她这个年纪中，少数会演戏的演员之一。而影评家已经开始把她和朱丽亚．罗伯丝相提并论，他们说她们都同样的没有过人之处，却非常有观众缘。至于她是不是一个黑皮肤，PLUS(大号) 的罗伯丝尚且有待票房推证，但是她以一共拍了4部电影的新手，片酬已经过千万，这至少证明了电影界对她的偏爱。

至于这个体重接近300磅的Hip Hop女王如何在会如此迷人，看过她在《芝加哥》中的她在酒吧的舞台上边歌边舞，又从胸口抽出一条手帕挑逗坐在桌子下面的男人们，你就理解了。风情，那是不限身高体重和相貌的自信的性感。不知道她是新人的人都轻叹：“这个人肯定是某个大角，我只是不记得她在哪里出现过了。”这和她作为Georgina Byrd穿着一身红色晚装出现在5星级酒店的餐厅里的场景一样，大家都交头接耳：这个人是谁？我肯定在哪里见过她。

电影里面的饭店侍应生赞美她：她太棒了，她想说什么就说什么，想做什么就做什么。而作为一个职业演员，她却说：我并不需要靠演电影来挣钱。所以我才可以细致选择电影。她是似乎是那种天生不惧怕镜头的人，满脸的表情都是，这就是我，这就是我想演得角色。

周末的首日放映场，观众坐的不多也不少。从预告片中，大家已经知道，这是一部更适合租回家里看DVD版的电影。它里面不会有流行的台词也没有新鲜剧情，自己的同事和上司周一也不会谈论这部电影。这是一部没有什么太多个性的轻松喜剧，其中女王奎恩•拉蒂法表演的非常可爱。

好像和影评家的评价一样。至于假如生命只剩3个星期这个问题，我其实也和那Byrd做得差不多。我当然希望我也有那样的运气─被误诊，非但不死还在赌场赢了10万美金，还赢了一个丈夫。唯一不同的是，我不会最后和Byrd一样开餐馆，我─我买股票。居然有分析家说goolge会涨到US2000/股，天啊，尖叫。

偏执的思念

我无法和任何人闲聊来分散偏执的思念
所以我躲在文字里面看自己的脚趾
我没有任何证据来理论爱情的来源和结果
所以我常常泡在电影院里取暖
我无法知道明天的快乐与否
所以我努力的规范着时刻表
起床，工作，写字，吃饭

你说爱情是一种毒药
还是一种解药
它只是减低了你对自己的信任感
怀疑着自己被孤独谋害着而没有保护

理智，青春，美丽，
没有一种武器
可以抵挡 一个人活在世界上
的危险

断背山

今天去看了《断背山》(Broke Back Mountain) ，影片拍摄的非常好。

第一，我周围坐的全是老年人，简直怀疑是老年公寓的专场。我说的老年人是指白发苍苍的50岁以上的。我的左边坐了两个老姐妹，一人还拿了一大桶爆米花。我们右边的两个是一对老年夫妇，也一派欢天喜地的样子。他们好像孩子一样的笑，比如开场JACK的TRUCK车轮打滑，掀起一阵土烟，她们也大声的笑。莫明其妙，后来明白，那是60年代的TRUCK，她们的笑是来源于：那种破卡车，我们太知道了。可见影片细节之处的真实。

第二，那不是Banff吗？他们放羊的地方，后来每年一两次约会“钓鱼的地方” 也全是我熟悉的风景。尤其是草原上的小河，河边的原始森林，原始森林后的石山，石山背后更深的雪山。我的每个夏天都会到那些地方游荡，冬天也会在那些雪山中滑雪，甚至可以看出ELBOW RIVER。还有美国国庆日放烟火的那场戏，我也百般狐疑，那些看烟火的怎么就象是加拿大农民，(还不是农民，比如说那些BIKER，就和我们这里的一样) 难道美国牛仔和ALBERTA农民一样，按说加拿大农民应该比TEXAS的农民有文化多的，(他们自己认为的，因为他们说话毕竟是更靠近英国口音) 。回来一看，果然是在加拿大Calgary 拍摄的，那些群众演员来自加拿大。这部电影其实应该作为Banff风土人情篇来宣传。不过，Ennis和Alma 结婚的那场教堂戏肯定不是在加拿大拍摄的。因为加拿大农民和美国小城镇的人的表情还是有所不同，而且教堂似有不同，虽然他们城市白领的表情都越来越照着business week的成功人的模范表情来走。
最早被globalize永远是跨国公司的雇员，没有听说过globalize的农民。

第三，没有过分的床戏的同性恋电影简直是唱一曲爱情颂歌。很深沉美好。

Snowing In Beijing

专业卖报纸的

某报某栏要求200字简介，遂书：
早年留学加拿大，后留在加拿大支援资本主义建设，兼任华文媒体《新生活周刊》副主编，同时为国内多家媒体撰写文字换钱。

后来一数，才60字，而且没有一句说实在话，看起来就象是到处卖新生活周刊的。

(无又，这张照片是去年头发没剪时朝的，纪念一下)

Danger time for America

Danger time for America
Jan 12th 2006
From The Economist print edition

The economy that Alan Greenspan is about to hand over is in a much less healthy state than is popularly assumed

DESPITE his rather appealing personal humility, the tributes lavished upon Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, become more exuberant by the day. Ahead of his retirement on January 31st, he has been widely and extravagantly acclaimed by economic commentators, politicians and investors. After all, during much of his 18½ years in office America enjoyed rapid growth with low inflation, and he successfully steered the economy around a series of financial hazards. In his final days of glory, it may therefore seem churlish to question his record. However, Mr Greenspan's departure could well mark a high point for America's economy, with a period of sluggish growth ahead. This is not so much because he is leaving, but because of what he is leaving behind: the biggest economic imbalances in American history.
One should not exaggerate Mr Greenspan's influence—both good and bad—over the economy. Like all central bankers he is constrained by huge uncertainties about how the economy works, and by the limits of what monetary policy can do (it can affect inflation, but it cannot increase the long-term rate of growth). He controls only short-term interest rates, not bond yields, taxes or regulation. Yet for all these constraints, Mr Greenspan has long been the world's most important economic policy maker—and during an exceptional period when globalisation and information technology have been transforming the world economy. His reign has coincided with the opening up to trade and global capital flows of China, India, the former Soviet Union and many other previously closed economies. And Mr Greenspan's policies have helped to support globalisation: the robust American demand and huge appetite for imports that he facilitated made it easier for these economies to emerge and embrace open markets. The benefits to poorer nations have been huge.
So far as the American economy is concerned, however, the Fed's policies of the past decade look like having painful long-term costs. It is true that the economy has shown amazing resilience in the face of the bursting in 2000-01 of the biggest stockmarket bubble in history, of terrorist attacks and of a tripling of oil prices. Mr Greenspan's admirers attribute this to the Fed's enhanced credibility under his charge. Others point to flexible wages and prices, rapid immigration, a sounder banking system and globalisation as factors that have made the economy more resilient to shocks.
The economy's greater flexibility may indeed provide a shock-absorber. A spurt in productivity has also boosted growth. But the main reason why America's growth has remained strong in recent years has been a massive monetary stimulus. The Fed held real interest rates negative for several years, and even today real rates remain low. Thanks to globalisation, new technology and that vaunted flexibility, which have all helped to reduce the prices of many goods, cheap money has not spilled into traditional inflation, but into rising asset prices instead—first equities and now housing. The Economist has long criticised Mr Greenspan for not trying to restrain the stockmarket bubble in the late 1990s, and then, after it burst, for inflating a housing bubble by holding interest rates low for so long (see article). The problem is not the rising asset prices themselves but rather their effect on the economy. By borrowing against capital gains on their homes, households have been able to consume more than they earn. Robust consumer spending has boosted GDP growth, but at the cost of a negative personal saving rate, a growing burden of household debt and a huge current-account deficit.
Burning the furniture
Ben Bernanke, Mr Greenspan's successor, likes to explain America's current-account deficit as the inevitable consequence of a saving glut in the rest of the world. Yet a large part of the blame lies with the Fed's own policies, which have allowed growth in domestic demand to outstrip supply for no less than ten years on the trot. Part of America's current prosperity is based not on genuine gains in income, nor on high productivity growth, but on borrowing from the future. The words of Ludwig von Mises, an Austrian economist of the early 20th century, nicely sum up the illusion: “It may sometimes be expedient for a man to heat the stove with his furniture. But he should not delude himself by believing that he has discovered a wonderful new method of heating his premises.”
As a result of weaker job creation than usual and sluggish real wage growth, American incomes have increased much more slowly than in previous recoveries. According to Morgan Stanley, over the past four years total private-sector labour compensation has risen by only 12% in real terms, compared with an average gain of 20% over the comparable period of the previous five expansions. Without strong gains in incomes, the growth in consumer spending has to a large extent been based on increases in house prices and credit. In recent months Mr Greenspan himself has given warnings that house prices may fall, and that this in turn could cause consumer spending to slow. In addition, he suggests that foreigners will eventually become less eager to finance the current-account deficit. Central banks in Asia and oil-producing countries have so far been happy to buy dollar assets in order to hold down their own currencies. However, there is a limit to their willingness to keep accumulating dollar reserves. Chinese officials last week offered hints that they are looking eventually to diversify China's foreign-exchange reserves. Over the next couple of years the dollar is likely to fall and bond yields rise as investors demand higher compensation for risk.
When house-price rises flatten off, and therefore the room for further equity withdrawal dries up, consumer spending will stumble. Given that consumer spending and residential construction have accounted for 90% of GDP growth in recent years, it is hard to see how this can occur without a sharp slowdown in the economy.

Handovers to a new Fed chairman are always tricky moments. They have often been followed by some sort of financial turmoil, such as the 1987 stockmarket crash, only two months after Mr Greenspan took over. This handover takes place with the economy in an unusually vulnerable state, thanks to its imbalances. The interest rates that Mr Bernanke will inherit will be close to neutral, neither restraining nor stimulating the economy. But America's domestic demand needs to grow more slowly in order to bring the saving rate and the current-account deficit back to sustainable levels. If demand fails to slow, he will need to push rates higher. This will be risky, given households' heavy debts. After 13 increases in interest rates, the tide of easy money is now flowing out, and many American households are going to be shockingly exposed. In the words of Warren Buffett, “It's only when the tide goes out that you can see who's swimming naked.”
How should Mr Bernanke respond to falling house prices and a sharp economic slowdown when they come? While he is even more opposed than Mr Greenspan to the idea of restraining asset-price bubbles, he seems just as keen to slash interest rates when bubbles burst to prevent a downturn. He is likely to continue the current asymmetric policy of never raising interest rates to curb rising asset prices, but always cutting rates after prices fall. This is dangerous as it encourages excessive risk taking and allows the imbalances to grow ever larger, making the eventual correction even worse. If the imbalances are to unwind, America needs to accept a period in which domestic demand grows more slowly than output.
The big question is whether the rest of the world will slow too. The good news is that growth is becoming more broadly based, as demand in the euro area and Japan has been picking up, and fears about an imminent hard landing in China have faded. America kept the world going during troubled times. But now it is time for others to take the lead.

没事八卦

房子越来越贵

看新闻，卡城一年的房价涨幅为全国最高13.5%，加拿大的平均涨幅5.5%。

当然，全省的工资涨幅也是全国最高，7.5%，估计卡城的涨幅也要高过这个省平均值差不多2%。我现在突然明白经济急速发展是怎么回事了。就是，我虽然去年长了工资，窃喜这不告诉人家，现在才知道原来大家长得都比我多。

前两天PETE发牢骚说现在Calgary和有一天得和CA差不多了，他们两个二年前上班用45分钟到市中心，但是现在用双倍时间。据说全加拿大找不到工作的青年都往这儿跑，他们现在全堵在上班的路上。

去年初看过一个数据，说本省还是全国生活水准最高的省。全加拿大ALS(平均生活水准)是美国ALS的84%，比起80年代末的87%是后退了。其时，加元/美元约82分。去年春天，BMO经济学家预测，加元对美元涨至87分。后来果然涨到了。

现在他们又预测，今年加元对美元会涨到90分。总结一下，觉得ALS大概也会涨到近90。

前两天丁猫问我现在是不是加元换RMB。最近，中国调整GDP，是不是给升值做先行。如果加元涨到90，RMB还没升，那值当然得换。当然怎么换汇都倒不过房价，说卡城房价从1997年到现在升了57%。实践出真知，我在这里上了深刻的一课。

These are golden days if you happen to be selling your house — especially in Calgary.

New housing prices continued the biggest string of increases since at least 1981, edging 0.5 per cent higher in November from October, Statistics Canada said Tuesday. Prices in Calgary posted the nation's biggest monthly gain for the third time in a row. Nationally, prices were 5.5 per cent higher than a year earlier.

The agency attributed November's gains to a steady market for new housing, along with higher building material and labour costs. Yet, unlike in U.S. housing markets, while Canadian real-estate prices have continued to streak upwards, economists don't foresee a sudden, steep slowdown here.

“Although the Canadian housing market merits close watching in light of recent strength, it does not warrant nearly the same degree of concern as is directed at the white hot U.S. market,” said Eric Lascelles, strategist at TD Securities Inc.

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Prices have climbed every single month since September, 1998, according to Statscan's Randy Sterns.

But signs of cooling are already appearing, with housing permits falling more than expected in November and housing starts likely to ease next year, separate reports showed today.

“This suggests that the Canadian housing market may be beginning to ease in an orderly fashion,” Mr. Lascelles said. “This should be viewed as good news, because it has never been in doubt that the volume of housing activity in recent years was unsustainably strong.”

Among cities, St. Catharines-Niagara, Kitchener, Edmonton and Québec City also led price gains, while Ottawa and Hamilton registered modest monthly declines.

Price increases in Calgary were mainly due to higher material and labour costs, specifically for drywall, flooring, lumber and excavation. Higher lot values were also a factor, Statscan said.

美国房市“热过头”，东西岸居民到内陆“另起炉灶”？

由于美国大都市的房地产价格近年如摩天大楼一般“高耸如云”，使得这些地区的不少居民开始出售他们手中的高价房屋，准备搬到低房价的城市。根据美国非营利性组织（MassINC）的调查显示，25%的麻塞诸塞州的居民表示，如果有机会，他们会搬离麻州。从2000至2004年，已经有约17万的麻州人宣告“转移阵地”，而他们告别这个地区的首要原因就是高生活成本，他们说，麻州最需要改善的地方就是房价要能让人负担得起（housing affordability）。

“我不想夸大强调这个趋势，但全美是出现这样一个特别现象：我们的确看到越来越多的人从美国的东西两岸沿海城市搬迁至房价较能负担得起的内陆地区（interior area）。”位于华盛顿的非营利性机构国家住房联合会（National Housing Conference）总裁兼CEO康拉德·伊根（Conrad Egan）对《华盛顿观察》周刊表示，“这些沿海地区的房价飙长或许是因为建筑法规，或许是因为建设公司的规划不同，导致房屋供求不平衡。”

房价飙高，沿海州民要搬家

在美国的另一端，夏威夷虽然同麻塞诸塞州相隔千里，却拥有类似的想法：根据夏威夷商业圆桌会议(Hawaii Business Roundtable)和太平洋资源伙伴（Pacific Resource Partnership）联合进行的民调显示，40%的居民表示，因为高涨的房价而曾考虑离开夏威夷。同样根据Economy.com的资料显示，近年来加州每年都要流失10万人口，许多居民选择将他们手中快速增值的房子出售，搬到房价相较低廉的州如亚利桑那、华盛顿和俄勒冈州。

“如果你能买到更多的房子并住在很好的地段，这么做（搬迁到内陆地区）是越来越合理了。”伊根分析道，“例如，负担不起旧金山海湾地区超高房价的加州人就选择搬到内华达的拉斯维加斯去。现在拉斯维加斯的房价也开始上涨了，加州人于是兴起搬家到亚利桑那的凤凰城或普里斯考特市（Prescott, Arizona）。”

根据国家住房联合会的资料库显示，旧金山房价的中值为70万5千美元，要能够在旧金山买这么一幢房子，一个家庭必须能有22万3千美金的年薪，而在旧金山担任小学老师的年薪不过5万3千美金，就算夫妻两人都有教职恐怕也只能“望屋兴叹”。相较之下，凤凰城的房价就十分吸引人：一幢房屋的平均中数区区19万3千美元，只要年薪达到6万1千美元的家庭就能负担得起，一名小学教师在凤凰城的年薪虽然只有4万5千美元，稍低于旧金山的教师薪资，但是对一个双薪家庭而言，拥有自己的房子不再是遥不可及的梦。

“薪资的减少若是在一定范围内，而人们觉得整体而言他们的生活还是变得更好（better-off）的话，他们还是会愿意搬的。”伊根对《华盛顿观察》周刊表示道。

全美住宅建筑商协会（National Association of Home Builders）于12月1日公布的一项报告显示，在全美超过50万居民的大都市中，印第安那州的印第安那波里斯市（Indianapolis, Indiana）是住房最便宜的城市，从2005年7月至9月间出售的房屋中，平均房价中数仅为12万5千美元，以至于90%卖出的房子对印第安那波里斯平均年薪中数是6万4千美元的家庭来说，都是可以负担得起的。同期在加州大洛杉矶地区所出售的房屋中，平均房价中数将近50万美元，仅有2.4%的此区居民能够负担得起。

工作机会佳，华盛顿特区受青睐

“全美国都遭遇很严重的劳动阶层的住房（work-force housing）短缺问题，尤其是在高房价的地区如加州、纽约曼哈顿、华盛顿特区、波士顿和芝加哥。”位于匹兹堡的都市设计事务所（Urban Design Associates）总裁唐纳德·卡特（Donald Carter）说道，“许多中、低收入家庭没有能力负担居住在他们上班的地方，上下班只好开车两小时或更长时间”。

伊根进一步解释华盛顿特区的独特现象：“在华盛顿越来越普遍的现象是，很多人一开始为了好的工作机会，尤其是联邦政府和政府合约承包商的职位，纷纷迁居到首都，但是呆了一、两年后他们又搬到华盛顿特区以外的、更好的住宅区，如弗吉尼亚州的费郡（Fairfax, Virginia）。也就是说他们还是要留在原来的工作岗位，但宁愿花更长时间通勤上下班。这对他们来说或许是个权衡之计（trade-off）。”

伊根也不忘强调，搬家到另一个州不象过马路一般容易，所以人们不会轻易搬家，总是要考虑到许多因素，除了计划搬入地区的房价问题外，是不是有亲友在当地、好的工作机会、好的教育体系等都是一般人在移居时需要慎重考虑的原因。伊根提到最近这个搬家趋势中有一个颇为特殊的现象，连原来拥有不错职业的家庭都宁愿搬到房价更便宜的地区。

“很多考虑搬家的人都是拥有固定收入和专长的人，他们也比较具有机动性（mobile）。”伊根分析道，“现代人的工作技能本来就是用脑用得多，技术也容易转移（transferable），这样的职业特点使他们的工作地点受到较少限制，不象以往在通用汽车（GM）生产线工作的工人就比较不能说搬就搬。”

但是伊根不认为这波全美房地产市场“高温不退”的繁荣景象是逼得大城市居民纷纷移居他乡的主因。

“一个更直接的原因是住房贷款更加容易获得了。”伊根向《华盛顿观察》周刊分析道，“现在的贷款产品不仅更具多样性，提供给想买房的人更多选择，贷款的相关资讯――如能不能贷到款、贷多少――也能更快地从网络上获取。这种贷款方式的弹性使得美国人更容易也更愿意 ‘另起炉灶’了。”

Casanova:古典喜剧

Casanova: 古典喜剧

想要在首映场中看到喜欢的电影要靠运气，这基本上就象古代进洞房的新郎倌，虽然听说过新娘的家世和七大姑八大姨传来的口碑，和不和心水还要在掀开盖头一瞬才知道。周末，我和我同怀心事的观众满满坐了一室，他们要么是来看帅哥海斯．雷吉( Heather Ledger) ，要么就是听说影片里有几个美女，要么是为了这个古代风流情圣的故事而来。毕竟，影院里“金刚” (King Kong) 、“慕尼黑惨案” (Munich) 和“艺妓回忆录” 等大片正在争夺票房，而圣诞节的电影的高峰期也开始落幕了。

Casanova讲的是十八世纪意大利威尼斯一个风流情圣卡萨诺瓦的故事。他辗转在女人们之间，欠下无数风流债，同时也艳名远扬。所有的女人都想得到他─把他留在床上，而梵第刚的检察官也想得到他─把他送上绞刑架。然而威尼斯的王子却一直庇护他，当他从地方官手里解救了卡萨诺瓦以后就给了他一道命令：娶一个具有美好声誉的女子，这样可以彻底的拯救他的风流。

卡萨诺瓦因此和仆人在街头整日游荡，终于见到了一个面容如圣母玛丽亚一样的美女。他们尾随美女，向她的父亲求婚并得以准婚，却不想这个美女却有一个隔河而望暗恋她的青年。青年深深陷入爱情，因此要和卡萨诺瓦决斗。决斗中，当卡萨诺瓦掀开对方的面具，他面对却是一个女子─青年人的姐姐。护弟如斯的姐姐弗兰西丝卡身手敏捷，并且聪慧美丽，卡萨诺瓦被她迷住了，甚至忘记了自己刚刚和另外一个女子订婚。无独有偶，弗兰西丝卡也早已许配他家，她的未婚夫是一个富有的贵族青年。三对男女一场在缘分天注的重新配对之后，梵第刚的检察官也终于如愿以偿的把卡萨诺瓦和弗兰西丝卡(她写了一本讨论男女关系的书)双双送上绞刑架。这个时候，失踪多年的卡萨诺瓦的生母却突然出现，冒充教皇的使者来劫法场…

影评家们说这部电影象有70年代轻松喜剧的一般典雅，情景有趣并一环一环风波迭起，没有色情暴力等现代因素，最后的结局皆大欢喜。

其实除了在有望得到奥斯卡提名的《断背山》中饰演同性牛仔的海斯．雷吉( Heather Ledger) ，和第一次担当主角的英国女星西耶娜•米勒(Sienna Miller) 上乘表演之外，最吸引你的是幽默轻松的剧情。那剧情似曾相识，仿佛是莎士比亚喜剧的现代续本。首先是男女之情，又发生在两个具有矛盾性的男女之间，又牵扯到教皇，王室等更高贵族，其中貌似君子不一定就正义。尤其是弗兰西丝卡男扮女装到法庭上为卡萨诺瓦辩护，简直就是《威尼斯商人》中聪明女子鲍西娅的翻版，她们都具有男人般的勇气和义气。

其中的配角也无比可爱，比如弗兰西丝卡的未婚夫虽然丑陋却善良而轻信。卡萨诺瓦的仆人宁愿守着卡萨诺瓦的名声和佩剑留下也不愿随卡萨诺瓦隐姓埋名的逃生。虽然有些夸张而荒唐，让人感觉到戏剧的设计痕迹，却这些却阻挡不了影院里观众快乐的大笑。
如果一部电影能够让你赏心悦目，轻松的跟随剧情又轻松离开，就是一部很好的周末娱乐电影了。

更何况，它还有点莎翁之风。

感谢

今天休假后第一天到编辑部。

开完选题会以后，LINDA说起圣诞节的时候收到一个从中国专递来的包裹，里面有两只女式提包，却没有留支言片语，大家都不知道是怎么回事。

拿来英文的专递单副件，周刊名下，却有langege 的字样。

我私人的朋友从来都有我的邮政地址，我想起去年中秋在泡网夸我们的报纸，并发出去十多份电子版，也许报社地址是从那些电子版报纸里面被发现的吧。

这和私人礼物不同，也应该算是送给我们周刊的一份礼物。

因无处投递，就在这里感谢一下，并祝新年快乐。

出生率降低会影响GDP吗

看经济学人，说几个国家的人口出生率降低让经济学家忧郁。甚至关系GDP
先是果，说人口出生率降低大部分是因为经济的衰退，以及社会资源的减少而带来的生活压力的增大，乃至成因为生存压力，自杀率高，酗酒。我看他们还不如直接说是失业率直接成因出生率。德国，意大利，日本，俄罗斯都是近年来经济较过去低迷，失业率高的国家。

后说是因，因为出生率低人口就会进入老龄化。那么GDP就会缓慢增长，人均GDP更低，因为人进入老龄那么生产力就低。拿社会福利的就多。这话，我有点质疑。首先是这几个国家基本都是靠高科技创造GDP的国家，没有多少人种庄稼。其次根据我的偶像GREENSPAN的理论，美国人都应该工作到65岁才应该拿社会保险及退休金，因为大家都长寿了人可以工作的年龄也增长了，他老人家70多岁还顶大梁呢。还有什么公司担心市场，还有政客担心军队等

然后又有说好，说出生率降低那么死亡率也会降低。而且现代的妇女们比60年代的妇女要多享受多少福阿。：)

我乐，想一下午这个问题。出生率和GDP之间应该有一个最佳比率值吧，每个国家在每个时期都应该不同。而这个最佳值应该我公司的6-segama一样，生产力和生产率加上生产资源如何合理运用，每个部门应该有多少人等等…我只是说，那GDP和出生率来成因果。这个题目一定早就人有书面著作了。

又见新闻说世界人口增长太快将在2050年达到80亿或90亿，说环境学家正担心环境保护和自然资源问题。

：)环境学家和经济学家本来就不是一家的。但都爱摆眉头深锁忧国忧民之大儒状。

Incredible shrinking countries
Jan 5th 2006
From The Economist print edition

Rich countries' populations are beginning to shrink. That's not necessarily bad news

DURING the second half of the 20th century, the global population explosion was the big demographic bogey. Robert McNamara, president of the World Bank in the 1970s, compared the threat of unmanageable population pressures with the danger of nuclear war. Now that worry has evaporated, and this century is spooking itself with the opposite fear: the onset of demographic decline.

The shrinkage of Russia and eastern Europe is familiar, though not perhaps the scale of it: Russia's population is expected to fall by 22% between 2005 and 2050, Ukraine's by a staggering 43%. Now the phenomenon is creeping into the rich world: Japan (see article) has started to shrink and others, such as Italy and Germany, will soon follow. Even China's population will be declining by the early 2030s, according to the UN, which projects that by 2050 populations will be lower than they are today in 50 countries.

Demographic decline worries people because it is believed to go hand in hand with economic decline. At the extremes it may well be the result of economic factors: pessimism may depress the birth rate and push up rates of suicide and alcoholism. But, in the main, demographic decline is the consequence of the low fertility that generally goes with growing prosperity. In Japan, for instance, birth rates fell below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman in the mid-1970s and have been particularly low in the past 15 years.

But if demographic decline is not generally a consequence of economic decline, surely it must be a cause? In a crude sense, yes. As populations shrink, GDP growth will slow. Some economies may even start to shrink, too. The result will be a loss of economic influence.

Governments hate the idea of a shrinking population because the absolute size of GDP matters for great-power status. The bigger the economy, the bigger the military, the greater the geopolitical clout: annual GDP estimates were first introduced in America in the 1940s as part of its war effort. Companies worry, too: they do not like the idea of their domestic markets shrinking. People should not mind, though. What matters for economic welfare is GDP per person.

The crucial question is therefore what the effect of demographic decline is on the growth of GDP per person. The bad news is that this looks likely to slow because working-age populations will decline more rapidly than overall populations. Yet this need not happen. Productivity growth may keep up growth in GDP per person: as labour becomes scarcer, and pressure to introduce new technologies to boost workers' efficiency increases, so the productivity of labour may rise faster. Anyway, retirement ages can be lifted to increase the supply of labour even when the population is declining.

People love to worry—maybe it's a symptom of ageing populations—but the gloom surrounding population declines misses the main point. The new demographics that are causing populations to age and to shrink are something to celebrate. Humanity was once caught in the trap of high fertility and high mortality. Now it has escaped into the freedom of low fertility and low mortality. Women's control over the number of children they have is an unqualified good—as is the average person's enjoyment, in rich countries, of ten more years of life than they had in 1960. Politicians may fear the decline of their nations' economic prowess, but people should celebrate the new demographics as heralding a golden age.

The downturn
Jan 5th 2006 | TOKYO
From The Economist print edition

But ageing employees need not be a problem, if companies adjust

JAPAN'S population is in decline. As of last October 1st, the government announced last week, giving the results of its latest five-yearly census, Japan's 127m-odd population was 19,000 fewer than a year earlier. Deaths had outstripped births for the first time in a period of peace since records have been kept. A falling population, the Yomiuri Shimbun duly wailed, meant that national survival was at stake. It may have a point: with no change in the current fertility rate—below 1.3 children per woman of child-bearing age—the last Japanese will die as soon as 2800.

Such are the perils of extrapolation. The more immediate demographic issue, though, is not so much the predicted fall in Japan's population, to as low as 100m in 2050, some say, but rather a shift in its composition. For as well as a low birth rate, life expectancy continues to lengthen (if that were not so, Japan's population would have started to fall some time ago).

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Japan is greying at an unprecedented rate. Half a century ago, the proportion of the population over 65 stood at around 5%, well below that in America, Britain, France or Germany. Today, Japan's proportion of elderly, at 19%, is the highest in the world, and is forecast to reach almost 30% by 2025. In particular, an exceptionally large group of Japanese, the baby-boom generation, is making its way towards retirement. After the second world war, returning Japanese soldiers married, settled down and produced children in large numbers. Between 1947 and 1949, an average of 2.7m children were born a year (with another 2.3m in 1950). That was 30-40% more than in the succeeding years. It made for a more defined population pyramid than, say, America, where the baby-boomers were born over several more years. Today, the country's demographic profile looks something like a Japanese lantern. Soon, it will look more like a narrow-based urn (see chart).

From next year, the baby-boomers start to retire (60 being the minimum mandatory retirement age for now). The prospect is causing some anguish among policymakers. As youngsters, these people were the shock troops during the golden period of Japan's post-war economic transformation. Today, they are the custodians of years of accumulated technical and management skills. Their absence, some suggest, will lead to a shortage of skilled workers and mentors, a loss of productivity and even a surplus of office space. Mama-san in her bar in Ginza will miss this lot.

A less noticed aspect of the greying of Japan is the coming sharp decline in the population of the youngest workers. At present, some 16m Japanese are in their 20s, many of them children of baby-boomer parents. But the number in this age bracket will shrink by about 3m over the next decade. The consequence of all this is, first, that fewer workers will support an ever growing number of non-workers, other things being equal; and, second, that the demographic shape of the workforce is assuming that of an inverted pyramid, with fewer young workers at the base where once there were many. These factors combined lead some commentators to speak of dire consequences: of a national malaise led by a decline in living and even educational standards (soon, for instance, you will be able to gain a place at university simply by sitting the exam), accompanied by a government bankrupted by retirement obligations.

Yet this is all far from inevitable. Atsushi Seike, a labour economist at Keio University, argues that, since the great bulk of older workers are company employees, the solution lies in fixing the corporate employment and retirement systems to allow people more easily to work for longer. Those systems were designed for the age of the pyramid. When lots of young people were coming into the workforce, mandatory retirement was adopted by companies who wanted to make room for them. The policy was also useful for getting rid of surplus workers that employment-protection laws otherwise stopped from being laid off. As a result, nine-tenths of companies with more than 30 employees today set a mandatory retirement age, usually 60, the legal minimum.

The government and some companies are starting to respond to the new circumstances. Already, eligibility for the fixed part of the state's two-tier pension benefit has been raised to 62; it will be 65 by 2013. Eligibility for the bigger, earnings-related part still stands at 60 till 2013, but rises to 65 by 2025. To bring corporate practices into line, a law passed in 2004 takes effect in April requiring companies to raise the minimum mandatory retirement age to 65 by 2013—or, if that is not feasible, to provide employment until they are eligible for the fixed part of the state pension.

These adjustments, Mr Seike thinks, are just tinkering at the edges of an outdated system. Since life expectancy has leapt by nearly 30 years since the war, to 82 on average, then the minimum age for pensions should be raised swiftly at least to 67 and preferably to 70. Moreover, he believes, mandatory retirement—forcing people to stop when they are keen to work longer and capable of doing so—“has no place in a society that hopes to make full use of its older citizens.” It should be scrapped altogether. So should age discrimination in hiring: many job advertisements are closed to anyone over 45.

Certainly, most older Japanese want to work. Indeed, the average working man finally leaves the labour market when he is approaching 70. The problem is that he is given jobs that do not always match his abilities. A system of pay based on seniority rather than merit, which once ensured employee loyalty, now imposes a financial burden on companies, making them unwilling to keep even good workers in their former jobs. So getting rid of mandatory retirement would also put welcome pressure on companies to revise pay scales better to reflect ability rather than length of service. That, surely, would suit ambitious younger people too.

紧张，严肃活泼，过一个又红又专的2006

作为一个符合巴洛夫”条件反射说”过惯了ROUTINE生活的穿白色领子的高级动物，我的新年开始于我打开公司电脑输入密码的那一刻。

在此之前的一个月，我恶迹累累做了很多平时不敢做得奢侈的坏事。比如说旅行，生病，每天睡到中午11点，不看股票报告忘了买TIME杂志，专业书一页都没有看看却买好多闲书，拼命SHOPPING，让电脑接受我的心理暗示“病毒”并假装它真坏了不能上网，忘记了一个牙医约会而且再没有给他们打过电话导致智齿再次发炎…几篇该交的文章都没有交，最后发展到信箱里的EMAIL都不回，电话留言也不复。

1月4日，我才发现经历上述劣迹之后，只有老板因为惦记预算报表还记得我的存在了。于是我准备回到人间生活。

新年初步计划如下：

1) 初一的时候到华严寺烧香，以保佑我的父母和所有爱的人。
2) 减少发呆的时间，更加合理的安排完成工作学习和爱好，按时睡觉按时并贴面膜。
3) 系统和有效的读书，不看畅销书，把闲书送给闲人和WD。
4) 继续八卦以增加对生活的热爱，继续小资以对那些说我小资的人呲之以鼻。
5) 认真学习中英文语法及减少错别字。
6) 少吃糖，锻炼身体，按时去美发店，按时去看牙医。

当然还有一些比较奢侈的想法，比如滑黑道，考过FA4，嫁人，但鉴于我去年的表现，还是别给自己太多压力才好。

：) 其实我这篇算是检讨，请朋友们原谅我的疏忽和懒惰。
从今天开始，又要整齐努力的重新做人喽。

恐怖片的警世作用

Wolf Creek: 恐怖片的警世作用

我看Wolf Creek其实是因为要写影评，却因此知道了在看一部电影前阅读影评的重要性─从而知道做一个写影评的人对爱看电影人类的贡献。因为我虽事先知道它是“R”级，却没有看“先行者” 的影评，因此，在电影进行到3/4的时候，终于身边的尖叫声里冲出了放映室。那速度绝对比我高中百米达标时还快，并且把我的购物袋忘在了座位上。最后，我踌躇着回去取那个袋子，顺便眯着眼睛看到了结局。后来我才看到一个美国女影评人说她在看到一半的时候真想从电影院里逃出来，因为它非常恐怖并似乎有鼓吹虐待女性的嫌疑。我其实更愿意相信那个女影评人实际上是逃出影院，但因养家糊口总不好说自己没把电影看完。

恐怖片爱好者，会给它很高的评价，非恐怖片爱好者，看这部片都会有夺路而逃的欲望。

这是一个澳大利亚小成本制作，取材于80年代末90年代初几个真实杀人案件的电影。假如恐怖电影是以从视觉感官转换成心理上的恐惧为目的话，那么电影的原著和导演Greg McLean无疑是成功了。电影从家庭自摄记录般缓慢的镜头开始，两个英国年轻女子和一个澳大利亚男子结伴在澳大利亚公路旅行。他们买了一辆1500澳元的破旧二手车，准备从西部开到东部。开篇将近一半的镜头，漫不经心的记录着她们在海边饮酒狂欢、在路上轮换着驾驶车、在旅行帐蓬营地一起看星星、她们吸烟喝酒接吻…昏昏欲睡的节奏中以足够让观众了解到，他们是有广大西方年青人中普通的几个，并且是喜欢旅行的“背包客” 。这样松散镜头，却带着观众更压抑的狐疑，不符合电影的情节和陈述方式─那背后必定是有什么深不可测，由此观者心中狼烟四起。

到了Wolf Creek这个陨石坠落点，三个年轻人下车登山观赏。等回到他们那辆破福特车前，两个女孩发现她们的手表都停了，而破车也怎么都发动不了。恐怖剧情开始展开。夜半时分，一辆卡车从天而降，车里有一个农场工人装束的中年人─他自告最奋勇帮他们修车，并应他们的要求把车拖到一个近的小城镇。结果三个年轻人们被拉到了一个废弃的矿井，听这个“好心的中年人” 讲他杀猪的故事─他讲得细致而陶醉简直绘声绘色。等她们再次醒来的时候，一个女孩被绑在黑乎乎的的工具房里，一个女孩已经满身血迹并无下装的面对这那个” 屠猪者” 的枪支，而男孩关在密室，一个仓库里面装满了各式汽车─它们的主人全部失踪。电影一直使用的单线索拍摄，并不把不同场景同时表述，反而更加加重了你的那种亲临现场感。

据我读过的艺术史，戏剧源于希腊的时候只分悲剧和喜剧。而美学家往往给悲剧更高评价，说悲剧在悲伤的剧情中更加提升了人类的高贵感情。假如归根到底恐怖片算是悲剧的话(它当然不可能是喜剧)我只看见我坚壁清野坠落了的恐慌。日版恐怖片，会直逼你的神经，因为它们设计的情节中的不真实假设，让你在对未知和无逻辑感到害怕。而大部分美国的恐怖片靠视觉的冲击和血腥直逼你的胃，因为它们的带来得恐慌会更具有现实联系性和可重蹈性。以Wolf Creek为例，它让我好几天祥林嫂一样的唠叨反思：

公路旅行比飞机旅行更危险。假如你非要公路旅行你就要买一辆防撬系统好的好车；假如你没有好车，那么你就要带至少几把好枪；假如你没有好枪，那么千万别去荒郊野外的地方，尤其是澳大利亚那样的荒原；假如你去了荒郊野外，车抛锚时候千万要锁死车门不管是小红帽还是大灰狼来了你都别开车门，并及时致电你的“汽车俱乐部” ；这就回到前题，假如你没有好车你也要有一个全球通卫星手机及时求救…我不是怕死，我是怕杀人变态狂。

等拿了我的购物袋走出专场放映厅的时候，门口已经有10多个青少年在排队抢场。按说非第一天首映的大片很少有人预先排队进场。那个时候我善良地想：鉴于恐怖电影的反面教材及警世作用─从此他们一部分人绝不作“背包客”，另一部分人一生都不敢去澳大利亚公路旅行。

Yours, Mine, and Ours：孩子要十个八个的养

Yours, Mine, and Ours：孩子要十个八个的养

年轻时候的妈妈大概曾经想要过很多孩子，所以有时她在喊我们吃饭的时候会 “大毛，2毛，3毛，4毛…”的一路喊下去，仿佛她有一群孩子。她还引用过有7个子女的奶奶的话：“养孩子就象养小猪，一个是养，一窝也是养。”

很多孩子的大家庭，在越来越工业化的城市里，已经成为古迹。梦想有很多孩子的父母，应该去看派拉蒙旧片新拍的《欢乐满堂》。一家十八个孩子，住在海边的一个灯塔房子里。他们每天早上起床要按时间表分ABCD洗手间的梳洗打扮，一起吃饭的时候占满一张长会议桌子，上学的时候刚刚挤满一个中型的校车。他们一起从校车蹦蹦跳跳的跳出来的时候，人生充满了喜剧般的幸福感。

丹尼斯．奎德饰演的美国海军的军官，和赖内．拉索饰演的雅皮手袋设计师，他们是一对高中时代的学校情人，30年以后的同学聚会让他们再次堕入情网，并在没有通知自己的孩子的情况下闪电结婚。这仿佛是触怒了两个由孩子组成的一向持批评态度的董事会。尤其是当他们一起搬入旧灯塔屋的时候，由于在不同的环境中长大，更因为军官爸爸和设计师妈妈的不同的教育方式，那里就成了“世界大战”的战场。最后，两家的孩子一起商定，要用尽手段拆散爸爸妈妈，让他们回到已经熟悉了的旧的生活方式。

于是他们故意涂画军官爸爸的家庭生活流程图，清理了手袋设计师妈妈以繁乱而充满灵感的工作室，甚至趁爸爸妈妈出门赴宴的时候在家里开了一个收门票的家庭音乐Party。导致Frank 和Helen之间, 爆发对不同的生活方式和教育态度互相指责。Frank甚至接受了调职到华盛顿的升迁机会，他的8个孩子将面临再次的搬家。那是孩子已经憎恨的生活，最后最小的孩子说了心里话：“我想和妈妈在一起。”

在美国感恩节周末上市的家庭喜剧《欢乐满堂》为了感恩节的全家欢聚一堂又提供了享受电影的机会。吃完感恩节大餐以后去看一场即没有暴露，没有色情满屋子孩子乱跑的欢乐电影应该是顺理成章的事情。可是已经有观众抱怨：我们已经在感恩节餐桌上听够了孩子的尖叫声。

更多的影评家认为这部重拍1968年由亨利方达主演的成功家庭喜剧是为了和下个月上市的《儿女一箩筐II》Cheaper by Dozen II竞争圣诞节的家庭市场。《儿女一箩筐I》在2003获得的良好票房，是它拍续集的直接原因，《欢乐满堂》也想在家庭片最好卖的圣诞节分点钞票。影评家不无刻薄地说：很显然，在数量上他们已经赢了。《欢乐满堂》是以一家18个孩子对抗《儿女一箩筐》的12个孩子。

实际上，在数量上“欢乐满堂”是以18个孩子加一头聪明的猪，一只狗，一只小老鼠对抗12个孩子和一只狗。而且，欢乐满堂的孩子里面还有两个黑头发的亚裔孩子，一对双胞胎。而那一头和丹尼斯．奎德结吻的猪表现得尤为出色，《环球邮报》的资深影评家说：那么多孩子很难让你留下印象，倒是那头猪真正的出彩了。

也有丹尼斯．奎德的影迷不能相信他变成了斯蒂夫•马丁Steve Martin(儿女一箩筐中的爸爸) ，但是丹尼斯比斯蒂夫扮演的父亲要多了海军军官的帅气，他穿着深蓝色的海军服，还有威风的军官帽，他和Helen的婚礼上，甚至有全身穿戴整齐的海军搭出的剑门。喜剧剧情，加灯塔守护者的浪漫爱情，还有满屋子乱跑的漂亮的孩子们…对于一部喜剧来说，你不能要求更多的责任和意义了。。

当18个孩子一起出动，帮助大哥当选了学生会主席；当孪生兄弟受坏孩子欺负的时候，身后站出来10个兄弟姐妹的时候；你还真会羡慕这样兄弟满堂的大家庭。

孩子10个8个的养，至少在电影里看起来是一个很好的主意。